PHP2Shell: a long Wednesday, and a surprisingly quiet Thursday morning

22 Oct 2026

PHP logo with a crack in it

On Wednesday 21st October, PHP shipped fixes for two critical remote code execution bugs that need no login, now known as PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619). Neither needs a vulnerable WordPress plugin. One is triggered by running PHP out of memory while it parses a request. The other lets state from one request leak into the next request on the same worker. If your site runs PHP, it was exposed.

Before the patch

The advisory arrived before the packages did, so the morning went on shrinking the attack surface. At 10:30 we turned off session.upload_progress for every PHP version on our servers. At 14:30 we added a temporary Apache rule that refused multipart POST requests, the most direct way to push a large, awkward body at PHP’s request parser. That rule also blocks file uploads, so it was never going to stay for long.

We also cut the upload limit from 128M to 32M. That change is permanent: hardly anyone needs more, and anyone who does can have it raised for their site.

Patching

The patched Debian packages arrived just before 14:50 and went onto every server within minutes. We restarted every PHP-FPM master, then rebooted. A few servers needed a couple of reboot cycles.

By 16:00 all our main web servers were confirmed patched and rebooted. We checked that each PHP-FPM binary contained the new functions from the fix, and that each running master had started after its package was installed. Then the multipart form data block came off.

Phew… that was the hard part done. Time to slow down and start looking to see if this was actually being exploited by the bad guys.

The quiet morning after

When wp2shell broke in July, exploit attempts arrived within hours, and they announced themselves in the user agent. This time we expected a surge of POST requests overnight. But it didn’t happen.

Overnight from Wednesday into Thursday, 57 requests came from tools mentioning PHP2Shell, from five IP addresses (across our eight main WordPress servers). They weren’t trying to hide themselves. Their user agents read php2shell-scan/2.0 (authorized-security-assessment) and shellflow-php2shell/1.0. They weren’t attacking, they were fingerprinting. They asked for composer.json and vendor/composer/installed.json, and tried the old PHP logo “easter egg” query strings, which haven’t worked since PHP 5.5.

None of them got anything useful back. Each request was redirected to HTTPS, refused with a 403, or answered with a 404. The 403s came from a short rule we added in response to the wp2shell event:

# A speed bump, not a defence: one line of attacker code gets round it.
# (?<!power) stops it blocking PowerShell clients and monitoring scripts.
<If "%{HTTP_USER_AGENT} =~ m#(?<!power)shell#i">
    Require all denied
</If>

To check your own logs, search for the user agent strings and list the client IPs:

# Scan access logs for php2shell or shellflow
grep -iE 'php2shell|shellflow' access.log | awk '{print $1}' | sort -u

What we did with it

These scanners now get a 12-hour fail2ban ban on their first request. We also tightened which files Apache will serve: developer and configuration files, logs, scripts and manifests now get a 403. Before switching that on, we checked two weeks of logs and found no legitimate requests for any of them.

Why so quiet?

Honestly, we don’t know. Quiet isn’t proof of safety: a real attacker doesn’t put the CVE’s name in their user agent. It may just mean there’s no working public exploit yet. We run a 500,000+ IP block-list which will be keeping out a chunk of the bad actors. But we’d still expect to see more exploitation attempts than we’re seeing.

Anyway, everything is patched and running smoothly. We’ll be keeping a close eye on the server log files.

If you have questions, get in touch.

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